Evidences
To gain a neutral perspective, the
First Republic
invited United Nations to send
an investigative mission to South Vietnam, despite official protests from
North Vietnam. Even though South Vietnam was working toward membership in United
Nations, the Secretary General granted the request.
Marguerite Higgins and an independent United Nations investigative team,
Southeast Asia Investigations Mission, and Ellen J. Hammer wrote on May 8, 1963
at 8:00PM, a large crowd, under the leadership of
Thich
Tri Quang, besieged Hue radio station demanding religious rights. The
station director, Ngo Gam, refused their demands and barricaded himself. He
called on the local fire station and government security forces for help. Major
Dang went to see Provincial Head who happened to be at the residence of Ngo Dinh
Can. Mr. Nguyen informed Major Dang he has direct contact with Thich Tri Quang
who promised no riot would be incited and the gathering was mostly peaceful. Not
quite convinced of the crowd's intention based on the reports from the radio
station, Major Dang contacted his Division Commander, who was not available. He
then consulted with General Le Van Nghiem, commander for First Military Corps,
who suggested Major Dang to follow the Provincial Head's order because the
incident was a civil not a miltary problem. General Nghiem further advised Major
Dang to handle the incident as expediently and as non-lethally as possible, or
he would face President Diem's wrath for not surpressing riots. Major Dang also
was given the authority to mobilize armor division as well as any means
neccessary. When security forces, in armored vehicles, arrived about 2 hours
after first reports of riots came in, with the Provincial Head, Nguyễn Văn Đẵng,
to negotiate with the venerable and the station director. Major Dang announced
to the crowd blocking entrance to the radio station that he had orders from his
superiors to use force, if neccessary, to protect the radio station, a military
strategic broadcasting position. An agreement was reached and Mr. Nguyễn Văn
Đẵng and Thich Tri Quang were allowed to enter the radio station with the
purpose of dispersing the crowd. As a crowd of 10,000 got violent and pushed
their way inside the radio station, security forces were unable to calm them
down. Fire hoses were first used to subdue the crowd, but were greeted with
hurling rocks and stones. When Major Dang and his entourage was about 50 meters
away, two large explosions blasted at the radio station's perimeter while Nguyễn
Văn Đẵng and Thich Tri Quang were inside, causing a massive stampede. In defense
against possible Viet Cong intrusion into the radio station during the confusion
under cover of darkness, Major Dang signaled his men, with 3 shots to the air,
to use MK3 concussion grenades to subdue the riot and secure the area. Fifteen
concussion grenades were used. At the time, the military had no other effective
means for crowd control such as tear gas and riot gears. After the crowd
dispersed, there were 7 dead and 1 dying, along with 15 wounded [United Nations, 1963] [Dommen, 2001] [Hammer, 1987] [Higgins, 1964].
The Trial
Mr. Francis Tan Nguyen opened the defense by stating the trial of Dang Sy was
not valid because:
- The victims were confirmed not to be prisoners of war, political prisoners or oppositions.
- The Military Tribunal could not hold trial for misconduct, after the accused was cleared on wrongdoings, under South Vietnam Military laws.
- Even though the military trial was public knowledge, leaking false information to the media to sway public opinion was unethical under any justice system.
These arguments were dismissed by the presiding judge and the prosecution proceeded.
The Tribunal then asked if Major Dang was under any pressure for his testimony in court, he re-iterated that he had been placed in dark isolation for weeks and had twice been pressured to
pin the responsibility on Bishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, in exchange for his freedom and future repercussions [Baltimore Sun, 1987], [Higgins, 1964].
Under oath, Major Dang's testified, in the 30 minutes alotted, that he received a
distress call from the radio station director asking for help in dealing with a
hostile group of advancing people, possibly armed. As head of Security, Major
Dang called Saigon Headquarters to report a large crowd beseiging the
broadcasting station. Saigon Headquarters ordered Major Dang to protect the
station at all cost due to its military use for relaying information to troops
and the public. Major Dang requested instructions on dealing with riots. Saigon
Headquarters allowed use of military force. With given authority, Major Dang
arrived with armored vehicles and troops from the First Division, internal
security police and other special forces. As precaution against violence from
rioters, Major Dang had his troops equiped with MK3, non-lethal grenades used in
local militia exercises. Upon arrival, the police and military police were
unable to disperse the crowd. Major Dang announced to a very large crowd of
agitated people to disperse; he had the authorization to use force, if
neccessary, to control riot. This perhaps, was the cause for the subsequent
series of media attacks against Major Dang [Dommen, 2001]. Major Dang then asked the crowd
to give way for the security forces to enter the station. With troops cordoned
off the immediate area, Major Dang and a small
security contingence entered the station. Upon entering the radio station,
Major Dang's entourage passed an overpass. Several children were climbing on top
of the wall to have a better look at the commotion inside the radio station. One
of the accompanying lieutenants warned Major Dang about the military
disadvantage of having unknown parties positioning on higher grounds. As a
precaution, Major Dang told the lieutenant to have someone removed the young
curious people from the wall. Before any order was enacted, a series of blasts
knocked the overpass on top of the wall, mortally wounded these young people.
The
eight victims were: Nguyễn Thị Ngọc Lan, age 12 (female). Huỳnh Tôn Nữ Tuyết
Hoa, age 12 (female). Nguyễn Thị Phúc age 15 (female). Lê Thị Kim Khanh, age 17
(female). Trần Thị Phước Tự, age 17 (female). Nguyễn Thị Yến, age 20 (female).
Nguyễn Văn Đại, age 13 (male) and Đặng Văn Công, age 13 (male) [United Nations, 1963] [U.S. Congress, 1967]. Using the
confusion, the crowd broke into a stampede, threatened to overrun the radio
station.
Major Dang defended the radio station in two phases. First he ordered his troops
to use water cannons from the local firemen to disperse the crowd. Most of the
people withdrew but an advancing crowd hurled back stones and rocks, as well as
insults and threats. Major Dang then signaled his men to use MK3 concussion
grenades to subdue the people who tried to enter the radio station. The
concussion effects were more successful then the water cannons. Major Dang met
his objectives: the crowd finally dispersed; the area was secured, and the
station Director, Provincial Head Nguyễn Văn Đẵng and Venerable Thich Tri Quang
were able to come out of the station [Dommen, 2001] [U.S. Congress, 1967] [Owosso Argus-Press, 1966].
The Witnesses
Other civilian witnesses countered that they heard the shots from Major Dang prior to the
explosions that caused the deaths. An audio recording supporting the civilian witnesses claims was presented; however,
prosecution could not secure the time and place of such recording.
Four members of the Security Contingence also appeared as witnesses.
Two soldiers gave testimonies that Major Dang initiated the barrage of grenades by throwing a green and a white grenades into the crowd.
Two other officers testified that Major Dang did not give orders
to fire upon the advancing crowd. However, these testimonies were not proven further
because these witnesses contradicted themselves upon questioning by the
prosecution [Dommen, 2001], [Hammer, 1987]. When facing contraditories from the witnesses, the prosecutor requested
additional testimonies, but the presiding judge declined [Christian Science Monitor, 1967] [Hammer, 1987].
The Rebuttals
The U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group issued a deposition that Major
Dang was absolutely innocent in the May 8th incident and the explosions were
caused by Viet Cong infiltrator. The deposition called Major Dang's methods
were humane and in accordance with his American training. The American Field
Training Manual was then presented by the defense.
General Charles E. Timmes also motioned two American weapon experts to testify the
effectiveness of MK3 concussion grenades at the trial. Inspite of his fluency in French and
basic English, the prosecutor denied this motion on grounds that American English
was too foreign to the Military Tribunal and prosecution. The Military court,
instead, called upon a Lieutenant Colonel in charge of South Vietnamese armory
to testify that the concussion grenades were lethal when applied. Two other lieutenants also testified that
they received orders to deploy the grendades. The prosecution then concluded that
Major Dang acted on his own, without superior orders [U.S. Congress, 1967].
The events occurred inside the radio station, as Major Dang and his contingence
entered, though not covered at the trial, varied. Some claimed that Major Dang
flat out told an apologetic Thich Tri Quang that the civil disobedience and
consequences would be his responsibility. Others claimed that Major Dang
directly conversed with Venerable Thich Tinh Khiet, the Head of the Buddhist
Hierarchy in Hue, who quickly apologized to the
government personnel present for the event, accepted the responsibility and
would explain to the public afterward [Hammer, 1987].
After the August 8th, 1963 incident, some sources indicated that Major Dang was
placed under arrest, relieved of his military ranks...etc... In contrast, he was
placed under administrative leave for 3 days until Ngo Dinh Can convinced
President Diem the deaths were not caused by government personnel and South
Vietnam should started its own investigation instead of relying on international
press and reports from the United States, which primarily came from Saigon
associated press bureaus and the enigmatic Dr. Errich Wulff [U.S. Congress, 1967].
President Diem agreed and ordered compensation for the victims
families [United Nations, 1963] [U.S. Congress, 1967] as well as took a stand that ultimately led to series of steps
that fell out of favor with international media [Dommen, 2001] [U.S. Congress, 1967]. While U.S.
Ambassador Nolting accepted the explanation, his replacement,
Ambassador Lodge did not [U.S. Congress, 1967]. At the time, the Kennedy Administration grew
increasingly concerned with the extraordinary pressures Ambassador Lodge placed
on the First Republic to reconcile with Buddhist forces [United Nations, 1963] [Dommen, 2001]. Senator Robert F.
Kennedy (D-NY), having exposure to South Vietnam's leaders and their ladies,
like Madame Nhu [Hammer, 1987], was concerned that efforts made by Ambassador Lodge might
break South Vietnam, rather than reconciled it [Dommen, 2001] [U.S. Congress, 1967]. After the November 2, 1963
coup, Saigon Headquarters issued a recall order for Major Dang, asking his
release from the First Division, for new assignment. The Military Junta
immediately imprisoned Major Dang upon his arrival at Saigon. The Revolution
Council then announced his indictment on May of the following year.
The Closing
When the court asked him to enter his plea for the charges of attempted and
premeditated murders, Major Dang pleaded not guilty. He stated he was executing
orders from his superiors and he did not order his troops to fire on
demonstrators. The presiding judge then cut short Major Dang's final rebuttal and
demanded his closing argument in one sentence.
Major Dang said his only mistakes, if the court demanded, were he was a
Catholic and he obeyed direct orders[Higgins, 1964], [WCWC News Service, 1964].
References:
- Dommen, Arthur J. The Indochinese experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam . Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Douglass, James. JFK and the unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters. Orbis Books, 2008.
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Higgins, Marguerite. Our Vietnam nightmare. Harper Row Publishing, 1965.
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Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November. Penguin Publishing Group, 1987.
- Death Sentence Asked for Vietnamese Major. Associated Press, 1964.
-
Vietnamese Major Enters Innocent Plea. Eugene Register-Guard, 2 June 1964.
- Vietnam Priests ask Review of Major's Trial, WCWC News Service, June 20, 1964.
- Justice Loser in Viet Court, WCWC News Service, June 12, 1964.
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Major Dang's superior were:
General Lê Văn Nghiêm - Commandant of First Division
Colonel Đỗ Cao Trí - Provincial Chief
Colonel Lê Quang Hiển - Deputy Provincial Chief
Major Dang's security contingency was composed of:
Captain Lê Nguyên Phu, First Division
Captain Nguyễn Kinh Lược, Special Forces
Captain Lê Duy Hiển, National Guard
Lieutenant Ky, Special Forces
Vehicles Used
Armored Vehicle - Condor 1
REFERENCE:
Viet DC Online
United Nations Fact Finding Mission
After the August 8th Incident at Hue, the arrests of dissidents at several
Buddhist temples in Saigon, and the protest of Venerable Thich Quang Duc,
Cambodia broke off diplomatic relation with South Vietnam
and declined further U.S. aid packages. Laos declared neutrality. Sixteen
members of United Nations filed human right violations against South Vietnam. To
clear itself of the allegations of persecuting the Buddhists, South Vietnam
Ambassador to Morocco Buu Hoi (Vietnamese: Bữu Hội),
invited an independent panel of representatives to visit and did an exhaustive
investigation of these allegations. Embassies from Afghanistan, Brazil, Costa
Rica, Dahomey, Morocco, Ceylon and Nepal,
accompanied by Marguerite Higgins, began their investigation on October 11 and
concluded their findings on December 9, 1963. This report was largely ignored by
international press until December 20, when Costa Rica Ambassador Fernando
Volio-Jimenez granted an interview to NCWC News Agency and brought it to
international attention.
On February 17, 1964, U.S. Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT) presented these findings
to Senator James Eastland (D-MS), chairman of U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Internal Security, to inform the American public that they had been misled [Dodd, 1964].
During their visit, the fact finding mission was permit to travel anywhere in
South Vietnam and met with many government officials, mainly Buddhists and
Confucian, as well as members of the Buddhist Hierarchy. No Catholic clergies or
citizens were invited to participate in the United Nations investigation.
Served as a time capsule, the mission's report consisted of United Nations
recommendations, the testimonies of South Vietnam government officials, demands
from moderate Buddhist leaders as well as the radical Thich Tri Quang
accusations of religious persecutions.
The appendices included decrees, dated from Emperor Bao Dai's reign, stating:
1) All South Vietnam citizens could enjoy practicing their faith of choice.
2) All religious flags must be flown below the national flag.
Some of the findings included:
1) There were no religious persecutions as the law did not single out any one
particular religion.
2) Deaths at the unfortunate incident near Hue radio station was caused by
explosions, most probably made by Communist infiltrators. As South Vietnam army
did not have such weapon in their possession.
3) There were only 8 dead, 7 children and one adult, in contrast to the 9 dead
and 24 wounded, as perpetrated by the international press.
4) Victims suffered massive wounds, in contrast to claims of gun or artillery
fires, as perpetrated by international press.
5) The victims came from various religions, not all were Buddhists, as
perpetrated by international press.
6) A young Buddhist monk reported that he was recruited to perform self
sacrifice acts, with promises of using drugs to dull pain, and he later learned
the heinous acts committed by the government were complete fabrications.
Ambassador Volio-Jimenez stated that though no government was perfect, the very
act of South Vietnam to invite United Nations investigators proved that the
First Republic was forthright and willing to fix its human rights violations, as
alleged by the sixteen member nations [United Nations, 1963].
The eight victims:
Nguyễn Thị Ngọc Lan, age 12 (female). Huỳnh Tôn Nữ Tuyết Hoa, age 12 (female).
Nguyễn Thị Phúc age 15 (female). Lê Thị Kim Khanh, age 17 (female). Trần Thị
Phước Tự, age 17 (female). Nguyễn Thị Yến, age 20 (female). Nguyễn Văn Đại, age
13 (male) and Đặng Văn Công, age 13 (male). Some of these
victims were Catholics.
REFERENCES
1. United Nation Fact Finding Mission, December 9, 1963.
2. Dodd, Thomas. U.S. Senate Report to Subcommittee of Internal Security. U.S. Senate, February 17, 1964.
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